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1 Introduction
Why should aggregate investment of large conglomerates depend on personal characteris-
tics of one single person, the CEO? In reality, decision processes are complex.1 Companies
are run by Executive boards and Supervisory Boards have control over the CEO. In some
cases, lower level managers make investment decisions under a specific threshold them-
selves, without consulting the Executive Board. Are personal characteristics of all senior
managers together perhaps a better predictor of corporate decisions than the CEO’s char-
acteristics alone? This is the question we tackle in this paper empirically for the case of
managerial optimism and corporate investment.
Corporate investment decisions are among the most important decisions of firms. Huge
amounts are at stake and investment decisions are long term. Corporate investment de-
cisions are even part of economic policy debates as economic growth heavily depends on
corporate investment. However, investment decisions are still not well understood.
The starting point when analyzing corporate investment is usually that a firm’s invest-
ment should only depend on the profitability of its investment opportunities as measured
by, e.g., Tobin’s Q (Modigliani and Miller (1958)). Investment should not depend on the
firm’s mix of debt and equity financing, cash flow or liquidity, or financial market con-
ditions. However, the evidence over the last 30 years shows that investment depends on
profitability (Tobin’s Q) but also on cash flow. This is called “investment-cash flow depen-
dence” or “investment-cash flow sensitivity” (see Hubbard (1998) and Stein (2003)). As a
consequence, new theories have been proposed which predict that investment is sensitive
1See, for example, the textbook treatment in Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006) or Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sautner
(2007).
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to the amount of cash in the firm. In agency theories, managers overinvest to reap private
benefits. External capital markets limit the extent to which managers can pursue these
goals. An influx of cash flow leads to the result that managers invest too much. Accord-
ing to asymmetric information theories, managers themselves restrict external financing
to avoid issuing undervalued shares. Cash flow increases investment and thus reduces
underinvestment. However, these theories do not explain reality very well. Stein (2003)
summarizes this current state of literature as follows: “What we know: Firms with more
cash invest more. What we don’t know: Why firms with more cash invest more.”
Recently, behavioral corporate finance theories have been proposed that are based on
managerial biases to explain corporate investment. Why should behavioral finance be
useful in explaining corporate decisions? There is a huge behavioral finance literature in
asset pricing and investor behavior. However, there is only little (empirical) research in
behavioral corporate finance, mainly due to data limitations. This is striking as behavioral
factors might be more relevant in firms since there are no arbitrage arguments, that are put
forth to argue that biases are eliminated, for example, in capital markets. Furthermore,
there is infrequent noisy feedback in corporations when compared to financial markets
which hinders learning.
Recently, models have been proposed that are based on managerial optimism. Exam-
ples are Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate (2005a). In these models, managerial
optimism is modeled as follows. Managers overestimate the return of investment or the
profitability of success. Managers think that shares of their company are undervalued.
A direct implication is that managers invest too much, i.e. more than in the first-best
situation. However, this is difficult to test empirically as the first-best situation (optimal
level) is not observable. But there are further hypotheses to test. In the case of optimistic
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managers, the intended investment level of these managers is higher than the first best
level. If the firm is financially constrained, the firm cannot increase debt to finance in-
vestment. However, equity is also not an option as optimistic managers think that the
own shares are undervalued. To summarize, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher
in firms with optimistic managers and this effect is stronger for financially constrained
(equity dependent) firms. Therefore, we can formulate the following two hypotheses that
we will also test in our paper (see Malmendier and Tate (2005a))2:
Prediction 1: The investment of firms with optimistic managers is more sensitive to cash
flow than the investment of firms with managers who are not optimistic.
Prediction 2: The investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms with optimistic managers is
more pronounced in equity-dependent (financially constrained) firms.
In other words, the link between optimism and investment is stronger in equity-dependent
(financially constrained) firms. The intuition is that in these firms the proportion of
cash flow financing is higher. Thus, the external capital markets cannot limit effects of
managerial optimism. This argument is similar in agency models.
Testing these models empirically is still at an early stage and only few papers are avail-
able. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) analyze U.S. data and construct an optimism measure
based on executive stock option exercise behavior and on stock transactions behavior of
CEOs. A CEO who is buying additional company stock is classified as optimistic. Mal-
mendier and Tate (2005b) also analyze U.S. data and construct an optimism measure
based on press portrays of CEO. Lin, Hu, and Chen (2005) analyze data from Taiwan.
Their measure is calculated using earnings forecasts of managers. All three studies confirm
2See Shefrin (2005) for a textbook treatment.
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the above predictions. Furthermore, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2006) calculate op-
timism and overconfidence measures of CFOs based on the Duke/CFO Business Outlook
survey. They find that firms with overconfident CFOs (i.e., CFOs with a narrow confi-
dence interval) invest more. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) examine whether acquisitions
by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns. Overconfidence measures
are based on high order acquisition deals and insider dealings. They find that overconfi-
dent bidders realize lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor
long-term performance. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that the probability of making
an acquisition is higher if the CEO of a firm is classified as overconfident. The effect
is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. Further-
more, the market reaction at merger announcement is significantly more negative than
for non-overconfident CEOs.
One big disadvantage of most of these studies is that they only focus on one person in
the company, such as the CEO or the CFO. However, it is not intuitive why aggregate
corporate investment should only be driven by biases of only one single person in the
company. In practice, investment decisions are usually not only made by one single person
in a company. Furthermore, investments under a threshold which is often about 2.5 million
Euros in large European companies are usually made by lower level managers without
consulting members of the executive board.3 And even large investment decisions are not
only made by the CEO or the CFO alone. We overcome this shortcoming by constructing
optimism measures that are based on a broader group of managers and which make use
of managers’ insider stock trades. The logic is similar to one of the Malmendier and Tate
(2005a) optimism measures. Managers should, if anything, reduce their exposure to firm
3See Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2006) or Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sautner (2007).
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specific risk. When managers voluntarily buy additional stocks of their own company,
they are classified as optimistic.
More generally, our study is part of the literature that links psychological measures and
economic variables to test behavioral finance models. Other examples are Dorn and Huber-
man (2005), Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane, and Willman (2003), Glaser and Weber
(2007), Graham, Harvey, and Huang (2006), or Puri and Robinson (2007).
Furthermore, our research is also related to recent studies that analyze the importance
of chief executive officers for firm outcomes (see, e.g., Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and
Wolfenzon (2007) or Westerberg, Singh, and Ha¨ckner (1997)) or the link between manage-
rial characteristics and corporate decisions (see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Guner,
Malmendier, and Tate (2008), and Kaplan, Klebanov, and Sorensen (2007)). Moreover,
our study is related to research that analyzes the link between insider trades and corporate
actions or, in other words, how much directors know about the future of their company
(see, for example, Ke, Huddart, and Petroni (2003) or Ravina and Sapienza (2006)).
The main results can be summarized as follows. Managers are optimistic. Managers vol-
untarily increase their exposure to company specific risk more often than they reduce
it, although they should, if anything, reduce their exposure. Furthermore, we find that
firms with optimistic managers invest more. Moreover, the investment-cash flow sensi-
tivity is higher for firms with optimistic managers. Consistent with theory, these results
are stronger for financially constrained firms. As new insights, we find that optimism of
all insiders has also explanatory power when compared to pure CEO optimism and that
the higher managerial optimism, the lower the excess value of a company. We also iden-
tify moderating variables that determine when the CEO is more relevant for corporate
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investment (firm size, corporate governance, type of investment). CFO optimism has no
explanatory power. These findings show that it is crucial to analyze how the exact decision
process works within a firm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our sample of firms
and explain the balance sheet and stock market data as well as the Directors’ Dealings
data. Furthermore, we show how we calculate the optimism measures used in this paper.
Section 3 presents the basic results on optimism and corporate investment and analyzes
whether firms with optimistic managers invest more when other variables are controlled
for. Section 4 contains the empirical evaluation of Hypothesis 1, i.e. whether firms with op-
timistic managers show a higher investment-cash flow sensitivity when compared to firms
with managers who are not classified as optimistic. Section 5 presents results on Hypoth-
esis 2 and analyzes whether the sensitivity of corporate investment to cash flow is indeed
higher for firms with optimistic managers. Section 6 answers the question of whether
managerial optimism leads to inefficiencies by analyzing the valuation consequences of
the fact that managers are optimistic. Section 7 discusses alternative explanations of our
results and the last section concludes.
2 Data Sets, Optimism Measures, and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Sample of Firms, Balance Sheet Data, and Stock Market Data
In this paper, we link balance sheet and stock market data on the one hand and optimism
measures of managers that are calculated by their insider trades on the other hand. Our
main sample is based on all non-financial German CDAX stocks between 2001 to 2006 as
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the insider trading legislation was introduced in the year 2001 (see below).4 To calculate
our financial constraints scores we use data from 1999 to 2006 to be able to analyze the
effects of financial constraints on subsequent corporate investment. Furthermore, we also
run our basic regressions (without our optimism measures) for the period from 1986 to
2006 to analyze whether the period from 2001 to 2006 was somehow special in terms of
investment behavior of firms (which it was not as will turn out). Because of differing ap-
proaches to compile the annual statement all financial companies were excluded. Overall,
we gather data on 835 non-financial firms.
Our main data source for balance sheet and stock price data is the Datas-
tream/Worldscope database. This is the primary data source of studies analyzing cor-
porate decisions in Europe (see, for example, Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006)). How-
ever also studies analyzing U.S. firms sometimes also use this database (see, for example
(Cleary 1999)). Table 1 shows a list of variables we gather.
The main variables we analyze are capital expenditures (additions to fixed assets; World-
scope data item WC04601) divided by lagged assets (WC02999), cash flow (EBIT plus
depreciation; WC18191+ WC01151) divided by lagged assets, and Tobin’s Q.5 We calcu-
late Tobin’s Q as in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003): Q is the market value of equity
(price times shares outstanding) plus assets minus the book value of equity all over assets.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of some variables for the firms in our sample. All
variables show similar patters compared to those shown on other studies.
4The CDAX covers all German shares admitted to the highest market segments (currently, the Prime Standard and
General Standard segments, an in earlier years the Amtlicher Handel). Therefore, the index reflects the performance of the
overall German equity market, and is consequently well suited for analytic purposes. See http://deutsche-boerse.com.
5All results are similar when we scale our variables by lagged total capital (WC03998), net property, plant, and equipment
(WC02501), or sales (WC01001). Furthermore, our results hold for different cash flow definitions.
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2.2 Directors’ Dealings Data
As already mentioned above, our optimism measures are based on transactions of members
of the Executive and Supervisory Board on their personal accounts. Insiders have to
report their trades to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin). For former
New Market stocks, this rule was introduced on March 1st, 2001 and for all other firms on
July 1st, 2002. These rules are similar to the U.S. rules. All insider trades must be reported
to the SEC. Table 3 gives an example of these Meldungen nach §15a WpHG (Directors’
Dealings) that can be downloaded from the web page of the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority (Bafin), www.bafin.de, or from the commercial web page www.insiderdaten.de.
During the period from 03/01/2001- 12/31/2006 a total of 15,870 directors’ dealings
were reported. As this study focuses on the transaction behavior of individual persons
as opposed to legal entities, all transactions that were executed by legal entities (e.g.
share repurchases) were excluded. For the same reason, all transactions that fall in the
category of pension transactions, securities lending, subscriptions rights, option granting
or stock transfer to employees were dropped. As a result, 11,241 insider transactions by
members of the Executive and Supervisory Board could be used in this empirical analysis.
676 transactions included in this data set either have a zero stock price or volume or
cannot definitely be classified as voluntary trades considering the description attached to
the transaction. Therefore, in a second data set, these transactions were excluded and
results from its analysis were used for robustness check. All results presented in the paper
hold for both sets of transactions. Table 4 shows the number of purchases and sales as
well as the average volume of purchases and sales in Euro broken down by members of
the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of the companies in our data set. For
both the Executive Board and Supervisory Board members, the average sales volume in
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Euro is larger than the average purchase volume. However, for both groups, the number
of purchases is higher than the number of sales. Thus, there are many cases in which
managers voluntarily increase their exposure to company specific risk.
To our knowledge, insider trading data has not been linked to corporate investment de-
cisions in the way we do it so far. Usually, studies analyze whether insider trades are
informative. An example is Lakonishok and Lee (2001). They find little market movement
when insiders trade and when they report their trades to the SEC. Furthermore, insiders
in aggregate are contrarian investors. However, they predict market movements better
than simple contrarian strategies. Insiders also seem to be able to predict cross-sectional
stock returns. The result, however, is driven by insider’s ability to predict returns in
smaller firms. For the German stock market, Rau (2004) finds a small market movement
in the days after announcement of insider trades.6
2.3 Optimism Measures
Based on transactions described in the previous subsection, we construct four measures
of optimism. After assigning the directors’ dealings to each company, we assess for each
year and company the number of purchases, the number of sales, the volume of purchases,
and the volume of sales. Thereupon, we accumulate on an annual basis the number of
purchases and sales and the volume of purchases and sales. Thereby we receive an an-
nual “number-” and “volume”-variable (see Table 5 for details). We call these variables
optnumber,EB+SB and optvolume,EB+SB. EB stands for members of the Executive Board, SB
for members of the Supervisory Board. On the basis of these two variables, we construct
6Similar results are obtained by Betzer and Theissen (2008) and Dymke and Walter (2007) for Germany.
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two further optimism measures, simple “dummy”-variables. If the “number” -variable is
positive, the “dummy-number”-variable equals 1. Otherwise it equals 0. We followed the
same procedure to construct a “dummy-volume”-variable. Consequently, a positive value
of the described variables indicates an optimistic expectation of the board members. We
call these two dummy variables optdummynumber,EB+SB and optdummyvolume,EB+SB
The four optimism measures are based on the transactions of Executive Board and Super-
visory Board members. The intuition for also incorporating members of the Supervisory
Board in the calculation of these optimism measures is simple. Very often, former CEOs
become the Head of the Supervisory Board and thus still influence corporate decisions.
Furthermore, the Supervisory Board also influences decisions on huge investments. How-
ever, as a robustness check, we calculate four additional optimism measures that are only
based on transactions of Executive Board members. We call these variables optnumber,EB,
optvolume,EB, optdummynumber,EB, and optdummyvolume,EB. These measures are perhaps
better measures of manager optimism as the Supervisory Board is not equally influential
in all firms. However, the four optimism measures that are only based on members of the
Executive Board are based on fewer people and transactions and are thus less precise. We
also construct the respective optimism measures for the CEO and the CFO alone.
For optnumber,EB+SB, the median is 0, and the mean is positive (0.1577). This is no surprise
given the larger number of purchases than sales as shown on Table 4. For optvolume,EB+SB,
the median is 0 Euro and the mean is − 414,034.9 Euro. Table 6 shows that the cor-
relation between these measures is 0.1382 (p < 0.0001). optdummynumber,EB+SB and
optdummyvolume,EB+SB are not equal in only less than 1 percent of all cases (such as
in IM Internationalmedia AG example (Example 3) in Table 5). The results for the vari-
ables based only on Executive Boards member transactions are similar. Furthermore, the
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EB+SB measures are highly significantly correlated with EB measures. For example, the
correlation between optnumber,EB+SB and optnumber,EB is 0.7946 (p < 0.0001). The correla-
tion between optvolume,EB+SB and optvolume,EB is 0.4209 (p < 0.0001).
3 Basic Results: Do Firms with Optimistic Managers Invest
More?
Table 7 shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures on several
control variables. The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets
in Regressions (1) to (8) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in Regressions (9)-
(11). In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin’s
Q as control variables. In Regressions (6) to (8), we also include the leverage ratio, the
natural logarithm of total assets, and sales growth as explanatory variables. In Regressions
(3) to (11), we also include an optimism dummy variable. The dummy variable is equal
to 1 when members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board (ALL), only the
Executive Board (EB), or only CEO are classified as optimistic in a given year.
In Regressions (1) and (2), we replicate results of prior studies on determinants of cor-
porate investment decisions. Investment is positively related to cash flow and Tobin’s Q.
In Regressions (3) to (11), we include our optimism measures. In all regressions, the sign
of these variables is positive. In Regressions (5), (8), (10), and (11), the dummy variables
are significant at least at the 10 % level. Thus, our first result is that firms with opti-
mistic managers invest more, even when other variables are controlled for. Table 7 shows
that the strongest results can be found for CEO optimism. The weakest relation between
managerial optimism and corporate investment is found for CFO optimism (not reported
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throughout the paper).7
Table 8 shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures on several
control variables for large firms (Regressions (1) to (6)) and small firms ((7) to (12)).
Large firms have above median total asset values, small firms have below median total
asset values. The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets
in Regressions (1) to (3) and (7) to (9) and (capex-industry capex)/industry capex in
Regressions (4) to (6) and (10) to (12). This table shows that the effects of managerial
optimism on corporate investment are mainly driven by smaller firms.
Table 9 shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital expenditures divided by
lagged assets on several control variables for firms with varying degrees of closely held
shares (in percent of shares outstanding) as proxy for ownership structure. This variable
represents shares held by insiders. It includes but is not restricted to shares held by offi-
cers, directors and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares of the company
held by any other corporation, or shares held by individuals who hold 5% or more of the
outstanding shares. Table 9 shows that managerial optimism mainly affects corporate in-
vestment in firms with a low number of closely held shares and (less strong) in firms with
a high number of closely held shares. Managerial optimism is never linked to corporate
investment in firms in the middle tercile of closely held shares. Table 10 replicates these
results for (capex-industry capex)/industry capex as dependent variable. Morck, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1988) find a similar nonmonotonic relationship between management own-
ership and market valuation of a firm, as measured by Tobin’s Q.
7The results are similar but less strong when the other optimism measures based in transactions or volume are included.
One reason might be that a higher number of purchases may simply be driven by a large board. However, we are not able
to control for board size. A similar logic applies to the volume measure.
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Table 11 shows fixed effects logit panel regression results of a mergers and acquisitions
dummy variable on several control variables. The dependent variable is set equal to one
if the “assets from acquisitions” variable is positive in a given year which happens in 32
percent of all cases (firm years). In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged
assets, lagged Tobin’s Q, and the natural logarithm of total assets as control variables. In
Regressions (3) to (5), we also include an optimism dummy variable. Table 11 shows that
cash flow, Tobin’s Q, and firm size mainly drive the probability of an acquisition. This
result is consistent with prior research (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate (2008)).
All optimism variables are positively related with the probability of an acquisition, but
only the optimism variable that is based on all insiders shows up significantly. We note,
however, that due to the low number of observations we are not able to explore this in
greater detail.
Furthermore, we ran a bunch of robustness checks. The results do not depend on regression
specification or the specific set of control variables. Furthermore, the results are similar
when lagged optimism measures are included. Results are weaker for optimism measure
based on volume. One intuition might be, that optimism measures based on volume are
less precise because they can be influenced by only one large transaction. Results are
similar when the years 2001 and 2002 are excluded. In these years, the insider trading law
was introduced (see above).
To summarize, we find that managerial optimism explains corporate investment even when
other variables are controlled for. The effect is mainly driven by CEO optimism in the
case of capital expenditures. However, optimism of other managers has also explanatory
power. The effects of managerial optimism on capital expenditures is especially strong in
small firms and stocks with a low percentage of closely held shares. In contrast to capital
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expenditures, CEO optimism has no explanatory power for acquisitions. For acquisitions,
optimism of all managers significantly increases the probability of an acquisitions whereas
CEO optimism alone does not.
4 Optimistic versus Non-Optimistic Managers
Prediction 1 postulated that investment of firms with optimistic managers is more sensitive
to cash flow than the investment of firms with managers who are not optimistic. We test
this hypothesis in Table 12. This table shows fixed effects panel regression results of capital
expenditures on several control variables for firms whose managers are classified as not
optimistic (Regressions (1), (3), and (5)) and optimistic (Regressions (2), (4), and (6)).
The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged assets. In all regressions,
we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin’s Q as control variables.
The table shows that the investment cash flow sensitivity is always higher for firms with
optimistic managers. The largest difference in coefficients is found for CEOs. We thus
confirm prior findings of Malmendier and Tate (2005a), Malmendier and Tate (2005b),
and Lin, Hu, and Chen (2005). We are thus able to confirm Hypothesis 1. Interestingly,
Tobin’s Q is not significant in regressions for optimistic managers. This can be interpreted
in the way that in such firms with biased managers, rational factors such as expected
investment profitability (as measured by Tobin’s Q) are not relevant for decisions.
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5 Financial Constraints and the Effects of Managerial Optimism
5.1 The Measurement of Financial Constraints
One of the key predictions of the literature is that the link between optimism and corpo-
rate investment is more pronounced in equity-dependent or financially constrained firms.
Studies usually use an index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and La-
mont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) (see, for example, Malmendier and Tate (2005a) or
Polk and Sapienza (2007)). However, there are other indexes that have been proposed in
the literature such as the Cleary-index (Cleary (1999)) or the Whited-Wu-index (Whited
and Wu (2006)).
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006), Cleary (2006), Glaser and Hirn
(2007), and Hennessy and Whited (2007) present extensive surveys of these and other
measures and analyze their interrelationships. Glaser and Hirn (2007) and Hennessy and
Whited (2007) find, for example, that the Kaplan-Zingales-index is designed to identify
firms with high need for funds whereas the Cleary-index and the Whited-Wu-index mainly
capture firms with high costs of external funds.
In the present paper, we choose the following approach. We use the Kaplan-Zingales-index
and the Whited-Wu-index to capture the different interpretation of financial constraints
mentioned above (high need for funds as well as high costs of external funds). Although
these indexes have been calibrated for U.S. stocks, they are also used to rank firms in
Europe. For example, Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2006), p. 20-27, identify financially
constrained firms in Germany and the rest of Europe using the Kaplan-Zingales index.
Glaser and Hirn (2007) show that this procedure is justified as these indexes yield similar
17
results when German stocks are ranked and the characteristics of these firms over financial
constraints quantiles are compared to the respective U.S. values. As a third financial con-
straint measure, we use the Cleary-index. Cleary (1999) divides his sample of U.S. stocks
into three categories: Group 1 firms which increase dividends and are likely not financially
constrained; Group 2 firms which cut dividends and are likely financially constrained and
Group 3 firms which do not change dividend payments. He then performs a discriminant
analysis to discover firm characteristics that are related with the above classification of
firms. While Group 3 firms are not used for purposes of discriminant analysis, they are
assigned financial constraints scores. We calculate a similar score for Germany (see below
for details). As Cleary (1999) does not use firm size in his discriminant analysis and as
Hennessy and Whited (2007) find large differences between the cost of external funds for
small and large firms, we calculate a fourth constraint measure which uses the original
variables proposed in Cleary (1999) and additionally includes firm size. In the following,
we call this index “own index”. Overall, we expect that our index might be the best index
to rank German firms to analyze the link between managerial optimism and corporate
investment for financially constrained firms for the following reasons: The index is cali-
brated for Germany and it includes firm size to capture one important facet of financial
constraints: high costs of external funds. However, as Hennessy and Whited (2007) note,
such indexes might not work well to identify firms with high need for funds, e.g. as a result
of lots of high NPV projects. However, we argue that in tests of the effect of managerial
optimism on corporate investment for financially constrained firms this fact is less severe
as optimistic managers think their firm has lots of high NPV projects although this might
not be the case in reality.
To be more precise, the Kaplan-Zingales-index based on the work of Kaplan and Zingales
18
(1997) and Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001) is calculated as follows (see Lamont,
Polk, and Saa-Requejo (2001), p. 552):
Kaplan-Zingales-index = −1.001909 · Cash flowitTotal capitalit−1 + 0.2826389 · Tobin’s Qit
+3.139193 · Leverageit − 39.3678 · DividenditTotal capitalit−1
−1.314759 · CashitTotal capitalit−1
(1)
Higher values of this index imply a higher degree of financial constraints.
The Whited-Wu-index is calculated as (Whited and Wu (2006), p. 543):
Whited-Wu-index = −0.091 · Cash flow itTotal assets it−1 − 0.062 · Dummy (positive dividend) it
+0.021 · Long term debtitTotal assetsit−1 − 0.044 · ln(total assets)it
+0.102 · Industry sales growthit − 0.035 · Sales growthit
(2)
To calculate the Cleary (1999) index with German coefficients, we run the following Probit
regression. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm
increases dividends and 0 for firms which cut dividends. As in Cleary (1999), this variable
is regressed on the current ratio, fixed charge coverage, financial slack divided by lagged
capital, the net income margin, sales growth, and the debt ratio.8 Variables are defined
in Table 1. To create the index, we use all coefficients of variables that are significant at
the 5 percent level (see Table 13). To calculate our own index, we simply add the natural
logarithm of total assets as further explanatory variable.
Table 14 shows descriptive statistics of various firm characteristics for constraints terciles
8Calculating the coefficients using a discriminant analysis yields similar results.
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that are based on all for indexes mentioned above. The results confirm prior literature
(see Glaser and Hirn (2007)). For example, constrained firms have a lower profitability, a
lower payout ratio, and are more likely to be financially distressed.
To test Hypothesis 2, we cannot split the sample in optimistic and non-optimistic man-
agers and run regressions for the most constrained firms and compare the investment-cash
flow sensitivity as was done in Section 4. The reason is that Glaser and Hirn (2007) show
for Germany that firms with the highest financial constraints do not show the highest
investment-cash flow sensitivity. One explanation is that among firms that are financially
constrained there are some firms that are financially distressed and to not invest at all.
This finding is consistent with Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), Cleary (2006),
and the interpretation in Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000). Thus, we follow the
approach of Malmendier and Tate (2005a) and regress investment on optimism*cash flow
for financially constraint firms. The results are presented in the next subsection.
5.2 Financial Constraints and the Effects of Managerial Optimism: Results
Prediction 2 stated that the investment-cash flow sensitivity of firms with optimistic
managers is more pronounced in equity-dependent (financially constrained) firms. We
test this prediction in Table 15. This table shows fixed effects panel regression results of
capital expenditures on several control variables for the one third of all stocks with the
highest financial constraints as identified by the Kaplan-Zingales-Index, the Whited-Wu-
Index, the Cleary-Index (with own coefficients), and our own index. See Subsection 5.1
and Table 13 for details. The dependent variable is capital expenditures divided by lagged
assets. In all regressions, we analyze cash flow divided by lagged assets and lagged Tobin’s
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Q as control variables. Furthermore, we also include an optimism dummy variable and
Optimism * (cash flow/lagged assets) as explanatory variables.
The first observation is that the financially constrained firms analyzed in Table 15 indeed
have lower investment cash flow sensitivities than we observe for our whole sample (see
Table 7). This result confirms Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), Cleary (2006),
and Glaser and Hirn (2007). Furthermore, the optimism*cash flow variable is significant
in all regressions when optimism is based on CEO transactions. This finding strengthens
the point that CEOs matter for corporate outcomes (see also Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez,
and Wolfenzon (2007)). In Regressions (10) to (12) in which financially constrained firms
are identified by the presumably most appropriate index as was argued in the last subsec-
tion, all optimism*cash flow variables are significantly related with capital expenditures.
The results are similar when lagged constraint measures are included. This result is not
surprising given the fact that there is some persistence of the ranking of firms over time
(see Glaser and Hirn (2007)). Unreported regression results show that this is never the
case for the other two constraints terciles. We are thus able to confirm Hypothesis 2.
6 Valuation Consequences of Managerial Optimism
In this subsection, we analyze whether managerial optimism is associated with inefficien-
cies that lead to lower market valuation of firms. Table 16 shows coefficient estimates
from regressions of excess value on a focused-firm indicator and control variables such as
in Berger and Ofek (1995), Table 3. Excess value is the natural logarithm of the ratio
of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the
imputed values of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s
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sales multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to that accounting item (see Glaser
and Mu¨ller (2007) for details on business segment data and the diversification discount
in Germany). Control variables are the natural logarithm of total assets, capital expen-
ditures divided by sales, and EBIT divided by sales. In Regressions (4) to (6) we include
our optimism dummy variables. In Regressions (7) to (9) we include lagged values of our
optimism dummy variables. Regression (1) shows a pooled OLS regression, Regression (2)
is a fixed effects panel regression without year fixed effects. Regressions (3) to (9) show
fixed effects panel regression with year fixed effects.
The results are similar to those presented in Berger and Ofek (1995). Table 16 shows that
diversification per se does not seem to be the reason for the diversification discount. When
fixed effects regressions are run, the focused-dummy is not significant anymore. Glaser and
Mu¨ller (2007) analyze the reasons for the diversification discount and its disappearance
once firm fixed effects are included in detail.
Table 16 shows that, the higher managerial optimism, the lower the excess value. This
result is robust across all optimism measures. This result is not consistent with insider
trading based on private information as managers are not correct with their expectations.
Lagged optimism variables also have a negative sign although they are not significant
anymore (Regressions (7) to (9)).
However, the results are consistent with the following interpretation. In some firms, man-
agers are biased. These managers make corporate decisions that are harmful for the firm.
Our findings throughout the paper are consistent with the interpretation that overinvest-
ment due to managerial optimism is one explanation for the observed lower excess value.
However, this does not seem to be the whole story, as all optimism measures are highly
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negatively correlated with excess value whereas the link between optimism and corporate
investment is less strong. Thus, managerial biases also seem to affect other corporate
decisions to the detriment of the firm.
7 Evaluation of Alternative Explanations
Two other explanations for the link between managerial optimism and corporate invest-
ment are insider trading based on private insider information and signaling. We discuss
these potential explanations in turn.
A CEO may decide to increase exposure to company risk because of private information
about future stock prices that makes buying stocks attractive. Inside information also
predicts investment-cash flow sensitivity. Since the information has not been incorporated
into the market price, the firms stock is undervalued and investment may be sensitive to
cash flow for the usual Myers and Majluf (1984) reasons (see also Malmendier and Tate
(2005a). One of the key distinctions between (over-)optimism and correct, private inside
information is success in later periods, on average. However, this not consistent with the
results presented in Table 16.
Another reason why CEOs may want to hold company risk is to convey a (potentially)
costly signal to the capital market that their firms prospects are better than the prospects
of similar firms. However, the most natural version of the signaling story would not predict
heightened investment cash flow sensitivity (see Malmendier and Tate (2005a). Signaling
should alleviate informational asymmetries and, thus, eliminate investment-cash flow sen-
sitivity among the firms in which CEOs hold their stocks. Thus, the tests of our investment
predictions themselves will help to dispel this alternative explanation.
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8 Discussion and Conclusion
In our study, we empirically analyzed the link between corporate investment and manage-
rial optimism. In contrast to existing empirical studies we did not only focus on optimism
measures of single managers like the CEO or CFO of a firm as investment decisions of
firms are usually not made by only a single person. Instead, our optimism measure was
based on the insider stock transaction behavior of managers that they have to report to
the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. The main results can be summa-
rized as follows. Managers are optimistic. Managers voluntarily increase their exposure to
company specific risk more often than they reduce it, although they should, if anything,
reduce their exposure. Furthermore, we find that firms with optimistic managers invest
more. Moreover, the investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for firms with optimistic
managers. Consistent with theory, these results are stronger for financially constrained
firms. We are thus able to confirm behavioral corporate finance models.
The results are consistent with the following interpretation. In some firms, managers are
biased. These managers make corporate decisions that are harmful for the firm. Our find-
ings throughout the paper are consistent with the interpretation that overinvestment due
to managerial optimism is one explanation for the observed lower excess value. However,
this does not seem to be the whole story, as all optimism measures are highly negatively
correlated with excess value whereas the link between optimism and corporate investment
is less strong. Thus, managerial biases also seem to affect other corporate decisions to the
detriment of the firm. Future research should thus analyze whether biases also affect other
corporate decisions. Recent examples of studies in this direction are Ben-David, Graham,
and Harvey (2006), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007), and Lin, Hu, and Chen (2008).
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However, there are some suggestions for future research. We only focused on capital ex-
penditures or M&A transactions. Future research should also focus on other investment
measures such as investments in R&D, advertising, or intangible assets. Furthermore,
other measures of investment profitability should also be analyzed. Moreover, better psy-
chological measures, optimism measures, and expectation measures of managers should be
gathered, for example, by using questionnaires to measure these variables. Furthermore,
studies have to document more deeply, how the investment decision process in firms looks
like.9 Who decides? When do lower level managers decide themselves? What is the thresh-
old under which lower level managers decide themselves? What is the precise mechanism
in practice of how managerial optimism affects aggregate corporate investment? What is
the role of corporate culture which may be affected by the CEO? And last but not least,
what can firms do to eliminate the effects of managerial biases on corporate decisions?
How can managers be debiased? Future research should analyze the effects of properly
designed management accounting system and corporate governance to eliminate these
biases and their effects on corporate decisions.
9Glaser, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Sautner (2007) is a recent example.
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Table 1: Definition of Variables
This table summarizes and defines the variables used in this paper and states their respective data source.
Variable Ratios Worldscope Definition/Worldscope Name
data item
Cash flow WC18191 EBIT
WC01151 + Depreciation, depletion, amortization
Capital WC02501 Property, plant, equipment (net)
Total assets WC02999 Total assets
Tobin’s Q Numerator WC08001 Market capitalization
WC02999 + Total assets
WC03501 - Common equity
Denominator WC02999 Total assets
Debt ratio Numerator WC03255 Total debt
Denominator WC02999 Total Assets
Dividends WC04551 Cash dividends paid, total
Dividend payout ratio WC08256 Dividend payout (% earnings)
Dividends per share WC05101 Dividends per share
Cash holdings WC02001 Cash and short term investments
Current ratio Numerator WC02201 Current assets
Denominator WC03101 Current liabilities
Fixed charge coverage WC08251 EBIT/(interest expense on debt + preferred dividends (cash))
Financial slack WC02001 Cash and short term investments
WC02101 + (0.5 * inventories)
WC02051 + (0.7 * accounts receivable)
Net income margin Numerator see above Cash flow
Denominator WC01001 Net sales or revenues
Industry sales growth Mean of sales growth per industry class, two-digit industry
classification code in Worldscope.
Long term debt WC03251
Capital expenditures (capex) WC04601 Capital expenditures
Net sales WC01001 Net sales or revenues
Altman’s Z Numerator WC18191 3.3 * earnings before interest and taxes
WC01001 + 1.0 * net sales or revenue
WC03495 + 1.4 * retained earnings
WC03151 + 1.2 * working capital
Denominator WC02999 Total assets
Analyst coverage [Source: I/E/B/S] Number of analysts making revenue forecasts for the company
Closely held shares WC08021
Firm age WC18272
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables for the firms in our sample. The table presents the
number of observations (firm years), means, and various percentiles. Time period is 1999 to 2006. All
variables are winsorized at the 1 percent level. Variables are defined in Table 1 and Subsection 2.1.
Observations Mean 10th percentile 25th percentile Median 75th percentile 90th percentile
(firm years)
Capex/lagged assets 4,230 0.077 0.008 0.019 0.042 0.084 0.162
Capex/lagged capital 4,229 0.192 0.010 0.034 0.086 0.177 0.380
Capex/sales 4,341 0.073 0.007 0.017 0.037 0.075 0.154
Cash flow/ lagged assets 3,544 0.427 -0.045 0.149 0.353 0.641 1.026
Cash flow/ lagged capital 3,543 1.045 -0.126 0.241 0.702 1.438 2.531
Cash/lagged assets 2,931 0.133 0.008 0.023 0.059 0.142 0.325
Tobin’s Q 4,151 1.644 0.849 1.012 1.245 1.748 2.771
Sales growth 4,297 0.221 -0.211 -0.053 0.059 0.232 0.675
EBIT/lagged assets 4,179 0.009 -0.238 -0.030 0.054 0.111 0.194
EBIT/sales 4,295 -0.092 -0.331 -0.027 0.039 0.090 0.155
Net assets from acquistions/ 2,007 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.056
lagged assets
Leverage ratio 4,411 0.572 0.199 0.385 0.599 0.756 0.877
Debt ratio 4,410 0.193 0.000 0.021 0.149 0.314 0.461
Long term debt/total assets 4,407 0.103 0.000 0.001 0.051 0.161 0.285
Closely held shares (%) 2,667 56.93 16.51 36.00 58.11 78.01 95.40
Current ratio 4,399 2.627 0.802 1.178 1.703 2.808 5.338
Fixed charge coverage 4,267 -1.569 -31.020 -1.800 2.740 9.620 42.100
Financial slack/lagged capital 3,910 11.126 0.470 0.970 2.252 6.820 25.255
Payout ratio (%) 3,780 15.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 27.025 54.485
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics of theMeldungen nach §15a WpHG (Directors’ Dealings) that can
be downloaded from the web page of the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bafin), www.bafin.de,
or from the commercial web page www.insiderdaten.de. The table shows the number of purchases and
sales as well as the average volume of purchases and sales in Euro broken down by members of the
Executive Board and the Supervisory Board of the companies in our data set.
Number of Average volume in Euro
Position of executive Purchases Sales Purchases Sales
CEO 1,605 621 146,969 1,944,474
Deputy CEO 32 39 245,035 730,585
CFO 292 193 87,783 379,098
Other member of Executive Board 1,503 1,169 138,216 715,141
Sum Executive Board 3,432 2,022 139,015 1,060,918
Chairman of the Supervisory Board 559 342 205,168 1,660,729
Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board 190 136 1,353,625 3,081,346
Other member of Supervisory Board 1,222 1,169 164,792 1,288,050
Sum Supervisory Board 1,971 1,647 290,844 1,513,517
Others 613 880 831,118 878,680
Sum Executive Board and Supervisory Board 6,016 4,549
34
Table 5: Calculation of Optimism Measure
This table presents three examples of how the optimism measures of insiders are calculated in this
paper. The table the name of the insider, the transaction date, and the position of the insider within
the firm. The position of the insider is coded as follows: V=Vorstand (Executive Board Member), V
V=Vorstandsvorsitzender (CEO), V F=Finanzvorstand (CFO), AR=Aufsichtsrat (Supervisory Board
Member), S=Sonstige (other insider), S F=Sonstige Fu¨hrungskraft (other manager). Then, the table
shows whether a specific transaction was a buy or sell transaction, the number of stocks traded, the price
and the total volume in Euro of the transaction. First of all, we code a purchase of stocks of the own
company by insiders as 1 and a sale as −1 (see the column Buy/Sell indicator). Per year and firm, we
then sum this indicator variable. The sum of these indicator variables is the optimism measure based on
the number of transactions (see the lines that are indicated with
∑
in the last column). To calculate the
optimism measure based on volume we first multiply the volume of a transaction (1) with the Buy/Sell
indicator. Then, we sum (1)*(2) per firm and year (see the lines that are indicated with
∑
in the last
column). These measures represent the optimism measures in a given year.
Year Name of insider Date Position Purchase Number Price Volume Buy/Sell (1)*(2)
in firm or indicator
sale (1) (2)
Example 1: 2005 Thomas Kniehl 22.11.2005 AR Sale 172 9.25 1591 -1 -1591
TAKKT AG Thomas Kniehl 22.09.2005 AR Sale 100 9.01 901 -1 -901
(Security Thomas Kniehl 10.01.2005 AR Sale 400 7.40 2960 -1 -2960
identifier
744600) -3 -5452
∑
2004 Waltraud Wa¨tjen 05.08.2004 S Sale 5000 6.95 34750 -1 -34750
Waltraud Wa¨tjen 25.06.2004 S Sale 7500 6.75 50625 -1 -50625
-2 -85375
∑
2003 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
2002 Dieter Schadt 04.12.2002 AR Purchase 8500 3.60 30600 1 30600
Dieter Schadt 02.12.2002 AR Purchase 1500 3.60 5400 1 5400
Dieter Schadt 30.07.2002 AR Purchase 5000 3.89 19464 1 19464
Dieter Schadt 26.07.2002 AR Purchase 2500 4.05 10125 1 10125
Dieter Schadt 22.07.2002 AR Purchase 25000 4.95 123750 1 123750
5 189339
∑
2001 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
Example 2: 2005 Ronny Schreiber 12.10.2005 AR Sale 498 18.74 9333 -1 -9333
Su¨dzucker AG Christoph Kirsch 12.09.2005 V F Purchase 3666 14.00 51324 1 51324
(Security Klaus Kohler 12.09.2005 AR Purchase 448 14,00 6272 1 6272
identifier Christoph Kirsch 06.09.2005 V F Purchase 4334 14.00 60676 1 60676
729700) Christoph Kirsch 25.05.2005 V F Purchase 20000 15.30 306000 1 306000
3 414939
∑
2004 Waldemar Gehlert 26.11.2004 S F Sale 449 15.05 6757 -1 -6757
-1 -6757
∑
2003 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
2002 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
2001 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
Example 3: 2005 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
IM
Internationalmedia 2004 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
AG
(Security 2003 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
identifier
548880) 2002 – – – – – – – 0 0
∑
2001 Stefan von Moers 26.11.2001 AR Sale 3500 26.04 91149 -1 -91149
Moritz Bormann 03.10.2001 V Purchase 3054 17.24 52659 1 52659
Moritz Bormann 02.10.2001 V Purchase 500 16.18 8090 1 8090
Florian Bollen 14.09.2001 V V Purchase 1960 20.49 40165 1 40165
Florian Bollen 13.03.2001 V V Purchase 5000 20.14 100713 1 100713
Florian Bollen 09.03.2001 V V Purchase 4100 24.58 100768 1 100768
Mathias Deyle 08.03.2001 AR Sale 11000 27.11 298155 -1 -298155
3 -86909
∑
35
Table 6: Correlation of Optimism Measures
This table presents the correlation of optimism variables, the significance level (in parentheses) as well as
the number of observations used in calculating the variables. Based on transactions described in subsection
2.2, we construct measures of optimism as follows. After assigning the directors’ dealings to each company,
we assess for each year and company the number of purchases, the number of sales, the volume of purchases
and the volume of sales. Thereupon, we accumulated on an annual basis the number of purchases and
sales and the volume of purchases and sales. Thereby we receive an annual “number-” and “volume”-
variable (see Table 5 for details). We call these variables optnumber,EB+SB and optvolume,EB+SB . These
optimism measures are based on the transactions of Executive Board and Supervisory Board members.
We also calculate additional optimism measures that are only based on transactions of Executive Board
members. We call these variables optnumber,EB and optvolume,EB . The respective variables for the CEO
and the CFO are defined similarly.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) optnumber,EB+SB 1
9,302
(2) optvolume,EB+SB 0.1382 1
(0.0000)
9,302 9,302
(3) optnumber,EB 0.7946 0.0344 1
(0.0000) (0.0009)
9,302 9,302 9,302
(4) optvolume,EB 0.1050 0.4209 0.0991 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
(5) optnumber,CEO 0.6547 0.0139 0.8607 0.0517 1
(0.0000) (0.1816 (0.0000) (0.0000)
9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
(6) optvolume,CEO 0.0618 0.3854 0.0659 0.9164 0.0519 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
(7) optnumber,CFO 0.2434 0.0403 0.2896 0.0897 0.1185 0.0589 1
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
(8) optvolume,CFO 0.0683 0.0729 0.0723 0.1809 0.0156 0.0548 0.2466 1
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1324) (0.0000) (0.0000)
9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302 9,302
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Table 13: Calculation of Financial Constraints Scores
To calculate the Cleary (1999) index with German coefficients, we run the following Probit regression. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a firm increases dividends and 0 for firms
which cut dividends. This variable is regressed on the current ratio, fixed charge coverage, financial slack
divided by lagged capital, the net income margin, sales growth, and the debt ratio. Variables are defined
in Table 1. To create the index, we use all coefficients of variables that are significant at the 5 percent
level. Robust p-values are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at
5%; * indicates significance at 10%.
Dividend increase
versus decrease
(1999-2006)
(1) (2)
Current ratio -0.016 0.016
(0.509) (0.531)
Fixed charge coverage 0.005 0.005
(0.012)** (0.005)***
Financial slack / lagged capital -0.004 -0.003
(0.098)* (0.238)
Net income margin 2.425 2.031
(0.000)*** (0.001)***
Sales growth 1.043 1.032
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
Long term debt / total assets 0.141 0.090
(0.677) (0.791)
ln(total assets) 0.109
(0.000)***
Constant 0.128 -0.579
(0.140) (0.000)***
Observations 1447 1447
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